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Abstract—Multicast is proposed as a preferred communication
mechanism for many power grid applications. One of the biggest
challenges for multicast in smart grid is ensuring source authen-
tication without violating the stringent time requirement. The
research community and standardization bodies have proposed
several authentication mechanisms for smart grid multicast
applications. In this paper, we evaluate different authentication
schemes and identify the best candidates for phasor data commu-
nication in wide area monitoring systems (WAMS). We first do
an extensive literature review of existing solutions and establish a
short list of schemes to evaluate. Second we make an experimental
comparison of the chosen schemes in an operational smart grid
pilot and evaluate the performance of these schemes by using
the following metrics: computation, communication and key
management overheads. The best candidates we consider are two
variants of ECDSA, TV-HORS and three variants of Incomplete-
key-set. We find ECDSA without pre-computed tokens and all the
Incomplete-key-set variants are inapplicable for WAMS due to
their high computation overhead. The ECDSA variant that uses
pre-computed tokens and TV-HORS perform well in all metrics;
however, TV-HORS has potential drawbacks due to a large key
management overhead as a result of the frequent distribution of
a large public key per source.
Index Terms—Multicast source authentication, Smart grid
security, Wide area monitoring systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid, a superimposition of cyber infrastructure
on a physical power system infrastructure, is envisioned to
provide a reliable and efficient power supply with a smooth
integration of renewables. Smart grid is a generic term that
comprises different systems. Advanced metering systems, de-
mand response management systems, substation automation
systems, and wide area monitoring systems (WAMS) are a
few of several systems that define a smart grid.
The cyber infrastructure in a smart grid facilitates two-way
communication of sensing (metering) data and control signals
among field devices and control centres. The field devices
and the communication infrastructure usually span a large
unprotected geographic area. One challenge for such a system
is protecting against cyber attacks; in particular, guaranteeing
message source authenticity to data consumers is difficult.
Different systems in a smart grid use different communica-
tion paradigms, have different real-time requirements and the
devices they use have different levels of resource constraints.
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Hence, there is no a one-size-fits-all security solution that
works for all systems.
In this paper, we focus on identifying the best source
authentication scheme for phasor data communication in wide
area monitoring systems (WAMS). WAMS use high-resolution
phasor data from several phasor measurement units (PMUs) to
provide real-time information about a power grid’s state and
can be used to trigger corrective actions to maintain reliability.
The North American Synchrophasor Initiative (NASPI) was
founded to facilitate the deployment and use of synchrophasor
technology for grid reliability and efficiency [1]. Although a
few years ago there were only a few hundred PMUs deployed
across the North American power grid and elsewhere, their
adoption has exponentially increased due to their perceived
benefits and their reduced cost [2]. PMUs provide time-
synchronized data at a high data rate compared to supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, typically from
30 to 60 samples/second. This enables power grid operators to
have real-time situational awareness of their grid, which in turn
enables them to implement fast response to unstable conditions
observed in the grid. Depending on the nature of the different
control applications that use WAMS [2], the overall delay
budget for synchrophasor data ranges from 4 to 20 ms [3].
Most of this budget is consumed by the communication and
computation excluding security related operations. Therefore,
the additional delay due to security is preferred to be in the
order of sub-milliseconds.
IP multicast is envisioned to be a preferred communica-
tion paradigm for PMU to Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC)
streaming [4], [5] because it is efficient for one-to-many
communication in that it relieves a PMU from sending several
copies of the same packet destined to multiple PDCs. Besides,
since a multicast group address is used as a destination,
new receivers can be added to an already operational WAMS
seamlessly without any setting changes to other PMUs or
other PDCs in the group. Multiple receivers are used for
different reasons. A common reason is to support redundant
PDCs for reliability. Another common reason is to have the
SCADA system and archive servers receive the PMU data
for supervision, fault detection and post mortem analysis. In
some cases, a utility shares synchrophasor data with other
neighboring organizations so that all utilities have a common
understanding of the state of the entire grid, which allows them
to better respond to detected conditions across the grid.
In spite of its benefits, multicast also comes with its own
security challenges. More specifically, designing a multicast
source authentication scheme for time-critical systems such as
WAMS is a challenging problem [6], [7]. As a result, this
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[8]. Guaranteeing source authentication (thereby message in-
tegrity) is crucial for WAMS because any tampering of the
synchrophasor data while in transit or injection of bogus data
by an attacker leads to wrong real-time situational awareness
of the grid; which in turn can lead to issuing wrong corrective
measures with catastrophic consequences.
A trivial approach to providing multicast source authenti-
cation is to use a shared key (group key) scheme that uses
message authentication codes (MACs). Several studies have
proposed this as fast authentication mechanism for different
smart grid applications [9], [10]. Although such a scheme is
computationally fast and provides group authentication, it does
not give any protection against an untrusted receiver since
such a receiver can impersonate the source using the shared
key. Group authentication can be considered sufficient for
homogenous substation automation systems as we can assume
that if one of the receivers in such a system is compromised,
other receivers are also likely to be compromised. In this paper
we consider WAMS, which are heterogeneous systems com-
pared to substation automation systems. In WAMS, receivers
are not necessarily colocated and may not have the same
level of security. Therefore, group key based authentication
is not viable in our framework because an attacker needs to
compromise only one receiver or source to compromise the
whole network.
An efficient multicast authentication requires a source of
asymmetry in the authentication information. In other words,
receivers should be able to verify the authentication informa-
tion, but should not be able to generate valid authentication
information [7], [8]. Different schemes use different sources
of asymmetry. Some schemes use as a source of asymmetry
the difference in the number of symmetric key materials that
sources and receivers know [11]; others use time [12] and yet
others use the computational intractability of the cryptographic
primitives used to generate the keys (e.g., one-wayness of
a function, collusion resistance of hash functions, factoring
difficulty, discrete log problem) [13]–[15].
In this paper, we evaluate the different multicast authen-
tication schemes that use asymmetry in the authentication
information and identify the best candidate for WAMS. The
set of metrics we use to evaluate the performance of these
schemes are computation overhead, communication overhead
and key management (key generation, distribution and storage)
overhead. From the literature review, the short-list we identify
for further evaluation are two variants of elliptic curve digital
signature algorithm (ECDSA) [14], “time valid hash to ob-
tain random subsets” (TV-HORS) [13] and three variants of
Incomplete-key-set [11]. An experimental comparison of the
short-list is then made in an operational wide area monitoring
system that deploys the National Instruments CompactRIO
9068 based PMUs and phasor data concentrators (PDCs)
to monitor a medium-voltage distribution network on the
EPFL campus [16]. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to perform an experimental comparison of different
authentication schemes using actual PMUs deployed on an
operational WAMS.
From our experiment, we find that even though the
Incomplete-key-set variants use only symmetric key opera-
tions, their high computation and communication overheads
make them impractical for WAMS based real-time applica-
tions. The ECDSA with no pre-computed tokens has low
communication and key management overheads; however it
has high computation overhead due to a slow key generation
at resource-constrained PMUs. Therefore, for all practical
purposes it requires hardware support in PMUs. The ECDSA
variant which uses pre-computed tokens for fast signature gen-
eration has small computation and communication overheads
which make it an ideal candidate for WAMS. TV-HORS also
has low computation and communication overheads, but it
has a large key management overhead as it requires frequent
distribution of a large public key that needs to be reliably
delivered to each receiver within a specified time window.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we present the state of the art. In Section III, we provide an in-
depth discussion of the short-listed schemes. We describe the
wide area monitoring system for the EPFL active distribution
network which we use as our testbed for the experimental
comparison of the schemes in Section IV. We present the
experimental results and comparison of the schemes in Section
V. Finally, in Section VI we conclude the paper.
II. AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS FOR IP MULTICAST
In this section, we cover the state of the art for multicast
authentication. We also identify which source authentication
schemes are more feasible for phasor data communication in
wide area monitoring systems (WAMS).
A. Asymmetric cryptography based schemes
Authentication schemes in this category include all schemes
that are based on digital signatures, such as RSA and ECDSA
[17]. Sources use their private keys to sign messages and re-
ceivers use the source’s public key to verify received message
source authenticity. These schemes are scalable in that they
require a single small-size public/private key pair for every
multicast source. However, directly applying these schemes
for most real-time (e.g., smart grid) applications is a chal-
lenge because of their expensive computation overhead. The
IEC standardization body in its IEC 62351- 6 [18] standard
suggests that RSA be used to authenticate IEC 61850 Generic
Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) / Sampled Mea-
sured Values (SMV) messages that have a 4ms response time.
However, resource constrained intelligent electronic devices
(IEDs) in substations are generally incapable of computing and
verifying a digital signature using the RSA algorithm within
the required response time. Yavuz in [19] proposed a fast RSA
based scheme by exploiting an existing structure in command
and control messages. Such a scheme, though efficient, is
not applicable for WAMS because the structure assumed in
[19] is not present in PMU measurements. Hohlbaum et al.
[20] show that, with today’s IED’s hardware, the software
implementation of digital signatures would not meet the real-
time requirements of GOOSE/SMV messages. They also show
the FPGA implementation of RSA signature with a key length
of 1024 bits is not feasible for systems that have less than 4ms
response time requirement. However, an RSA implementation
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are shown to be feasible solutions.
The cost of specialized hardware are expected to be af-
fordable in the future that we can imagine digital signature
solutions be preferred solutions in future smart grid devices.
Therefore, we consider digital signature based solutions as one
of the candidates for multicast authentication. More specifi-
cally, we choose ECDSA as the preferred candidate among
digital signature schemes to be included in the short-list, as
it has a shorter public/private key length and signature size
compared to RSA for a similar security level.
B. One-time signature (OTS) schemes
One-time signature were first proposed by Lamport [21]
and by Rabin [22]. Subsequent works on OTS [13], [23],
[24] improved the signature length and computation overhead
required for signing and verification. Law et al. in [25] provide
a simulation-validated mathematical analysis of the different
OTS schemes and identify TV- HORS [13] as the favourable
authentication scheme for real-time applications in terms of
providing a balanced computation and communication ef-
ficiencies relative to security level. In a different context
from WAMS, Lu et. al in [26] compare by simulation TV-
HORS with RSA when applied for multicast authentication
in substation automation systems. Their results show that TV-
HORS performs better than RSA, in terms of computation
cost. From our literature review and from works that did
theoretical and simulated comparison of OTS systems, TV-
HORS is shown to be the preferred scheme among OTS
schemes. Therefore, TV-HORS is included in our short-list
of candidate schemes for further evaluation.
C. Message authentication code (MAC) based schemes
MAC based schemes use a shared symmetric key between
a sender and a receiver to generate a cryptographically secure
authentication tag for a given message The simplest scheme
in this category uses a group key shared among the multicast
source and all the receivers. For example, a multicast extension
to IPsec (RFC 5374) uses group keys to provide message au-
thenticity and confidentiality. Secure distribution of the key to
the multicast group members is handled by the group domain
of interpretation protocol (GDOI, RFC 6407). The IEC 61850-
90-5 [9] standard specifies the multicast extension of IPsec
to secure synchrophasor data. Zhang and Gunter [10] also
propose using IPsec for securing multicast data in substation
automation and show the stringent latency constraints (less
than 4ms) can be satisfied with their solution. The problem
with all group key based solutions is they do not provide
protection against a malicious receiver, i.e., any receiver that
has the shared key can impersonate a legitimate source.
Another variant of the symmetric key based solution uses a
secret-information asymmetry to cope with the impersonation
problem stated above. Canetti et al. [11] propose such a
scalable scheme suitable for systems with a large number of
multicast receivers. In this scheme, the source knows a set
of secret keys to authenticate a multicast message and each
receiver knows only a subset of these keys that enable it only
to verify the authenticity of received messages without being
able to generate valid authentication information for messages
[8]. The source attaches MACs computed using all its keys
to the messages and each receiver uses its subset of keys to
verify the authenticity of the received message. We refer to
this scheme as the Incomplete-key-set scheme [26].
As the Incomplete-key-set scheme uses only fast MAC com-
putations and does not require buffering before authentication,
we include this scheme in the short-list of candidate schemes
for further evaluation. In Section III-C, we provide a more
detailed description of the scheme.
D. Delayed key disclosure schemes
Like the schemes in II-C, schemes in this category use a
keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) for source
and message authentication. The main difference between the
two categories is the source of asymmetry, i.e. delayed key
disclosure based schemes use time as a source of asymmetry.
The source computes the HMAC of a message by using a
symmetric key that only it knows. The receiver buffers the
message until it receives the authentication key from the
source. The source then discloses the key in its subsequent
messages. Timed efficient stream loss-tolerant authentication
(TESLA) [12] and its variants [27], [28] are examples of
this scheme. To minimize the effect of packet losses, TESLA
employs a chain of authentication keys linked to each other
by a pseudo random function. Each key in the key chain is
the image of the next key under the pseudo random function.
Delayed key disclosure schemes have low computation
overhead (only one MAC function) and low communication
overhead. The drawback with these schemes is they need to
buffer messages, which makes them inapplicable for real-time
smart grid applications like WAMS. Thus, we do not include
schemes from this category in our short-list.
E. Signature amortization schemes
Signature amortization refers to using a single signature for
authenticating a group of multicast packets, thereby spreading
(amortizing) the signature verification cost across this group
of packets [29]. A receiver has to assemble all the packets in
the group before verifying their collective signature. As the
introduced delay due to buffering makes them inapplicable
for real-time applications, we do not consider schemes in this
category for further evaluations.
Table I provides a summary of the different authentication
schemes with respect to some desirable properties for WAMS.
We have selected these desirable properties that are applicable
for WAMS from those identified in [7] and [19]. A perfect
scheme would be one that performs well in all the identified
properties. As can be seen from the table none of the schemes
satisfy that requirement. The subset of schemes we have
chosen for further evaluation are those that satisfy the first
three properties.
III. CANDIDATE MULTICAST AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES
FOR WIDE AREA MONITORING SYSTEMS
In this section, we give a description of the three multicast
authentication schemes that we identified in Section II as
candidates for wide area monitoring systems.
4TABLE I: Summary of different multicast authentication schemes with respect to different desirable properties for WAMS.
PKC OTS MAC based Delayed disclosure Amortized
RSA ECDSA TV-HORS Group key IKS TESLA RSA based
Immediate authentication (no buffering) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Provides asymmetry Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Robust to data packet loss Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial Partial
Scalable for large systems Yes Yes Moderate Yes No Yes Yes
Free from time-bounded security Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Low computation overhead No No Yes Yes No Yes No
Low communication overhead Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Low key storage at source Yes Yes No Yes No Moderate Yes
Low key storage at receiver Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
IKS: Independent-key-set; PKC: Public key cryptography
A. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
The elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) is a
public-key authentication scheme whose security is based on
the computational intractability of the Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [14]. ECDSA provides the same
level of security as other digital signatures, such as RSA, but
with a smaller key size. Smaller keys enable ECDSA to have a
faster computation time. For this reason, ECDSA is the digital
signature scheme of choice for new applications: for example,
Bitcoin relies on ECDSA for its security.
Below, we provide a brief description of the steps required
to set up an ECDSA based multicast authentication system.
More specifically we describe the domain parameter setup, key
pair generation, signature generation and signature verification.
1) Domain parameters setup: The public/private key pairs
used by ECDSA are generated with respect to a particular
set of domain parameters (p, a, b,G, n), where p is the prime
modulus, a and b are coefficients of the elliptic curve, G is
a group generator of prime order n. For better security, the
elliptic curve should be chosen from a small set of elliptic
curves referenced as NIST Recommended Elliptic Curves in
FIPS publication 186 [17].
2) Key pair generation: Once the domain parameters are
chosen, public/private key pair is generated as follows:
(a) Private key is a random integer d ∈ [1, n− 1].
(b) Public key Q = dG is a point on the elliptic curve.
3) Signature generation: Given a hash function h and a
sender’s key pair (d,Q), a message m is signed as follows:
(a) Select random k ∈ [1, n− 1].
(b) Compute (x1, y1) = kG.
(c) r = x1 mod n. If r = 0, go back to step a.
(d) Compute s = k−1(h(m) + rd) mod n.
If s = 0, go back to step a.
(e) The signature for message m is the pair (s, r).
4) Signature verification: Give a sender’s public key Q, the
authenticity of a received message m is verified as follows:
(a) Compute (x2, y2) = s−1(h(m)G+ rQ).
(b) Verification succeeds if x2 ≡ r mod n and r,s ∈ [1, n−1].
An interesting feature of ECDSA is that signature gener-
ation is faster than signature verification. This is a desirable
feature for applications like WAMS because message sources
(PMUs) are more resource constrained than message receivers
(PDCs). Even with such asymmetry, signature generation is
still expensive. A typical approach to achieve fast signature
generation is to pre-compute r and k’s modular inverse k−1
before the message is known [30]. By pre-computing ℵ of
these tokens offline, we later use them to sign ℵ messages as
they appear at a minimum cost. In this paper, we evaluate the
performance of ECDSA signature generation with and without
pre-computed tokens.
B. Time Valid Hash to Obtain Random Subsets (TV-HORS)
TV-HORS [13] is an extension of hash to obtain random
subsets (HORS) [23] authentication scheme. TV-HORS in-
herits HORS’s advantages of fast message signing and ver-
ification. TV-HORS achieves small signature size and faster
computational efficiency by signing only part of the hash of
the message and by using a time-bounded signatures to prevent
signature forgery. The signature period (a.k.a., epoch) is the
maximum possible duration a signature can be exposed before
it is verified. This duration has to be short enough so that
an attacker cannot get a partial-hash collision of the signed
message within that time duration.
One drawback of TV-HORS is the need for a periodic
exchange of a large public key. TV-HORS uses two approaches
to decrease the public key refresh rate: (1) It reuses its private
key to sign multiple messages within a given epoch, i.e., it
functions as a multiple-time instead of a one-time signature
scheme. (2) It uses multiple key pairs linked together by using
one-way hash chains, as show in Figure 1, to authenticate
a large number of streaming packets without needing to
redistribute a new public key at the end of every epoch.
S0,1		 S0,2		 S0,3		 S0,N		 K0	
S1,1		 S1,2		 S1,3		 S1,N		 K1	
SP-1,1		 SP-1,2		 SP-1,3		 SP-1,N		 KP-1	
SP,1		 SP,2		 SP,3		 SP,N		 KP	
Epoch 1 
Epoch P 
S2,1		 S2,2		 S2,3		 S2,N		 K2	
Epoch 2 
Public key for epoch 1 
Private key for epoch 1 
(Public key for epoch 2) 
…
…
…
…
…
Salt chain Light chain 
time 
Ki	=	H(Ki+1)	
Si,	j	=	trunc(H(Si+1,	j	||	Ki))	
…
 
Fig. 1: TV-HORS key pairs linked using one-way hash chains. At epoch j, the light
chain s(j, ) and the salt kj form the active private key. This private key can sign upto
v message within that epoch. A session has a total of P epochs. A key chain is refreshed
at the end of epoch P .
Though the “multiple timed-ness” feature improves the
public key refresh rate, it also has security ramifications. It
exposes more elements in the private key with every signed
5message. Thus, it provides an attacker with more opportunities
to forge a message using the released private key elements.
The security level L for TV-HORS is expressed as a func-
tion of three parameters: the maximum number of messages
that can be signed by a private key within an epoch v, the
number of elements in a private key N and the number of
elements in a signature t. As shown in [13], L = t log2(N/vt).
The security level L is a security parameter such that an
adversary has to compute 2L hash computations on average
to obtain a valid signature for a new message. Hence the TV-
HORS parameters N, t, v should be chosen such that the above
formula satisfies a required security level L.
C. Incomplete-key-set
The basic idea behind the Incomplete-key-set scheme is
the sender appends to each multicast message multiple MACs
computed by using different symmetric keys. The asymmetry
between senders and receivers is provided by the fact that the
source knows more secret keys than each receiver.
Below we present three variants of this scheme that apply
for two different scenarios.
1) Incomplete-key-set for a small number of receivers per
group: In WAMS where the number of receivers is small
(in the order of tens), implementing a variant that we re-
fer to as perfectly-secure Incomplete-key-set is sufficient.
For a multicast group of R receivers and any number of
sources, this scheme uses a total of R primary secret keys
κ = {k1, ..., kR} from which R secondary secret keys
κs = {f(s, k1), ..., f(s, kR)} are generated and assigned to
each source s, where f(.) is a pseudo-random function. Each
receiver r is assigned a distinct primary key kr from the set κ.
The source authenticates a message m by computing R MACs
using its R secondary secrets and concatenates all the MACs
with the message. Each receiver r computes the secondary
key of s that corresponds to its primary key kr and verifies
the authenticity of the message by verifying the MAC that
was computed using this secondary key. However, it is not a
scalable solution since the communication overhead (size of
the MACs) grows linearly with the number of receivers.
2) Incomplete-key-set for a large number of receivers per
group: In a system where there are a large number of multicast
receivers, Canetti et al. [11] proposed a scheme that we
will refer to as the basic Incomplete-key-set scheme. This
addresses the scalability issue associated with the variant
introduced above. This scheme uses a set of l < R primary
keys κ = {k1, ..., kl} from which a set of l secondary keys
κs = {f(s, k1), ..., f(s, kl)} are assigned to each multicast
source s. Each receiver r is assigned a set κr of primary keys
such that κr ⊂ κ. When sender s wants to multicast message
m, it computes l MACs using the secondary keys in κs and
sends the message m, along with the l MACs. On receiving
a message from sender s, receiver r computes the secondary
keys of s with the primary keys in κr. It then verifies all the
MACs that were computed using these secondary keys. If any
of these MACs is incorrect, then r rejects the message.
The basic Incomplete-key-set scheme is susceptible to col-
lusion attacks. A group of fraudulent receivers can collude
among each other such that for each receiver j in the fraudu-
lent group,
⋃
κj can completely cover the key subset κu of a
given receiver u with a certain probability.
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Fig. 2: Key distribution for the Incomplete-key-set authentication scheme.
Let a multicast group have a maximum number of w corrupt
users and let q be the probability that κu for any receiver
u is completely covered by the subsets held by the coalition
members. The authors in [11] show that the number of primary
keys l is given by l = e(w+1)ln(1/q). Each receiver r obtains
a subset κr of primary keys such that |κr| = e.ln(1/q).
Depending on the values of the system parameter w and
q, the number of keys l can be large thus the communica-
tion overhead can be large. The authors in [11] propose a
communication-efficient variant of the basic scheme that uses
MACs with a single bit as output so that the authentication
information is reduced to only l bits. For such a setting, the
number of MAC computations are four times that of the basic
scheme, i.e., the total number of primary keys l and |κr| are
four times that of the basic scheme.
IV. SYSTEM SETUP AND EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe the active power distribution
network that we used as a testbed to perform our experiment to
compare the three multicast authentication schemes introduced
in the previous section. We also introduce the performance
metrics we use to evaluate the schemes.
A. EPFL Campus Smart Grid Monitoring System
We carry out the experimental comparison of the authentica-
tion schemes on the smart grid infrastructure deployed at EPFL
to monitor the power distribution network of the campus.
Figure 3 depicts the map of the EPFL campus smart grid
infrastructure. The smart grid infrastructure deploys PMUs
at different locations on the campus. The PMUs measure
synchrphasor data at the different locations at a rate of
50 samples/second, encapsulate the data according to the IEEE
C37.118.2-2011 standard [31] and multicast it over UDP to
aggregation points called phasor data concentrators (PDCs).
Each synchrophasor measurement from a PMU is 74 bytes
long. A PDC time-aligns the measurements from the different
PMUs and feeds the time-aligned synchrphasor data to a real-
time state estimator that is co-located with each PDC. The
output of the real-time state estimator enables us to monitor
the current state of the grid. Our monitoring infrastructure of
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Fig. 3: The EPFL smart grid infrastracture with 7 PMUs as multicast sources and 3
PDCs as multicast receivers.
the smart grid pilot on the EPFL campus has a total of 7 PMUs
and 3 PDCs in total. A more complete description of the smart
grid infrastructure can be found in [16].
With no security (authentication or encryption) deployed,
the overall latency between the time the synchrophasor data
is sent from the PMU to the time the state estimator output
is computed has a mean value of 17 ms. This relatively low
latency in computing the state of the grid enables us to have a
real-time grid monitoring system, which in turn enables us
to implement real-time corrective measures when the state
estimator output indicates a deviation from the grid’s stable
state. Any tampering of the synchrophasor data by an attacker,
while in transit from the PMUs to the PDCs, leads to a wrong
state estimator output; which in turn can lead to issuing wrong
corrective measures with catastrophic consequences - thus the
need for message authentication.
B. Comparison Metrics
The set of metrics we use to compare the performance of the
multicast authentication schemes are computation overhead
per message, communication overhead per message and key
management overhead. Computation overhead refers to the
processing time required to generate an authentication code
(signature) at the sender and to verify the authenticity of the
message at the receiver. Some of the schemes we evaluate have
asymmetric computation overhead for authentication and ver-
ification. An authentication scheme is considered efficient for
a real-time application if the sum of the authentication and the
verification time is small. Communication overhead as a metric
refers to the length of the authentication data that a scheme
generates per message. This metric is important especially in
systems where the network bandwidth is a constraint. The third
metric, key management overhead, is the cost associated with
the generation, distribution and storage of the key material.
The key generation overhead is the CPU time required by
a PMU to generate the keys. The distribution overhead is
the bandwidth required to distribute the key material to the
communicating partners. The storage overhead is the amount
of memory required to store the key materials.
An ideal authentication scheme for WAMS is one that has
low overhead in all the metrics. However, finding a scheme that
satisfies all such requirements is difficult. WAMS are real-time
applications. Thus, a small computation overhead is consid-
ered a critical requirement. In contrast, utilities are likely to
have dedicated state-of-the-art communication infrastructure
for their sychrophasor data communication. Therefore, low
communication overhead can be considered a soft requirement.
The key management overhead, however, is a combination of
both computation and communication overheads. Thus, a low
key management overhead is also a critical requirement.
It is important to mention here that the three schemes are
immune to packet losses if the packets contain application
data (not key materials). For these reasons, we don’t make
any comparison among the schemes based on resistance to
loss of packets containing application data. In contrast, packet
losses during key distribution may affect the performance of
a scheme and is discussed in Section V-B.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND COMPARISONS
A. Implementation and Parameter Settings
The multicast sources at the EPFL smart grid pilot are
National Instrument’s CompactRIO 9068 based PMUs with
a 667 MHz dual-core ARM Cortex-A9 processor, 512 MB
DDR3 memory and 1 GB nonvolatile storage running NI
Linux Real-Time OS. Likewise, each receiver is a PC with
an Intel 2.8 GHz Core i7 processor and a 4GB RAM running
Ubuntu 12.04 with Linux 3.2. The source and receiver are
implemented in C and use OpenSSL [?] open source tool kit
to implement the authentication schemes. We use SHA-256
whenever we need a hash output for any of the schemes.
1) Threat model: The attacker is assumed to have an
indepth knowledge of the the power system model so that
he can launch an attack similar to the one proposed by
Liu et al in [32] by corrupting measurement data from a
selected set of PMUs to stealthily introduce arbitrary errors in
the state estimator’s output of certain state variables without
triggering an alarm from a bad data detection algorithm. The
first ever cyber-attack on three Ukrainian regional electric
power distribution companies that caused a widespread power-
outage in Ukraine on December 23, 2015 demonstrates the
practical feasibility of mounting such an attack successfully
[33]. Moreover, we assume that an attacker has continuous
remote or physical access to the communication network of the
WAMS from which he can intercept and capture measurement
data from the selected PMUs. We also assume the attacker has
access to a cloud computing resource that is equivalent to the
computing capacity of a few thousand PCs. The attacker uses
the computing resources to recover the secret (private) keys
used to authenticate the synchrophasor messages in real time
and uses them to authenticate forged messages and send them
to the receivers as if they were sent from the legitimate PMUs
whose keys are compromised. Since the PMUs refresh their
keys periodically, the attacker can use a compromised key only
until it is refreshed. Hence, the attacker needs to continuously
follow the key refresh by the PMUs and re-do the key retrieval
from captured messages after every refresh.
2) Security level and key refresh rate: The different au-
thentication schemes have different parameters whose values
affect the schemes’ performance and security level. In order to
make a fair comparison of the schemes, we set their parameters
so that they all have equivalent security levels. According to
7[34], an ECDSA in a subgroup of m-bit size has an equivalent
security level with a symmetric key based scheme of m/2
bits key-length. The security level of a symmetric key-based
scheme is equal to the key length. As stated in Section III-B,
the security level for TV-HORS is defined by L=t log2(N/vt).
Message authentication in WAMS is a short-term issue, i.e.,
it is enough to guarantee that the signing key is hard to break
between the signing time and the signature delivering time
[35]. Therefore, in our implementation, we use short-term keys
by putting a bound on the life time of these keys.
As shown in [13], it takes 16x103 workstations to break
TV-HORS with L=54 in 6 days. Eberle et al. in [36] show
it takes 3.01x107 machines equipped with ECC-processor to
work together for about 24 hours to break an 112-bit ECC
key (L=56) and 1.02x1015 machines to break a 160-bit ECC
key (L=80). In our experiment we considered two security
levels: an intermediate security level L=56 and a stronger,
future proof security level L=80. Based on the above data,
we believe that a security level of L=56 is strong enough
in the presence of an attacker with a computing capacity
stated above if the keys are refreshed with in a few tens of
seconds or even minutes. We have considered L=80, to see
how the schemes compare when an attacker is likely to have
more powerful computing capability in the future as cloud
computing resources become more affordable.
For the intermediate security level, we generate the ECDSA
key pairs from the elliptic curve domain secp112r2 - a SECG
curve over a 112-bit prime field. ECDSA keys generated from
this curve have a security level L=56. For the Incomplete-key-
set variants, we use a symmetric key-length of 56-bits. We set
the TV-HORS parameters (N=1024, t=13, v=4), which give
us L=56. For the stronger security level L=80, we use the
160-bit elliptic curve secp160r2 for ECDSA, a symmetric key-
length of 80-bits for the Incomplete-key-set and the parameters
(N=1024, t=16, v=2) for TV-HORS. From the contour lines
in Figure 4, we see that there are a range of values for v and
t for a fixed value N to achieve a required security level L. A
contour line in the v−t plane show all the possible (v, t) pairs
(only integer pairs) that give a value on the L axis that has the
same color as the contour line. We took two representative set
of values for t and v (one for L=56 and another for L = 80)
to conduct our experiment.
For all the schemes, we use a session duration Ts=20 sec.
The message sending rate of the PMUs in our WAMS is
λ=50msgs/sec, where each message is 74 bytes long syn-
chrophasor data. Therefore, the PMUs stream 1000 messages
during one session. We assume the key material for the
entire session for all the schemes are pre-generated. For TV-
HORS, the key-chain length (number of epochs P ) is given by
P=Ts ∗ λ/v. Therefore, for the case where L=56, the number
of epochs P=250 and for the case L=80, P=500. Note that
a larger P value means a larger key generation and storage
overhead. It also means the average verification time increases
at the PDC.
The public keys for ECDSA and for TV-HORS and the
symmetric keys for the Incomplete-key-set that are used during
session i are pre-generated and distributed during session i−
1. Similarly, for the ECDSA with pre-computed tokens, all
Fig. 4: TV-HORS security level (L) as a function of v and t for a fixed N=1024.
the tokens required for the entire session i are locally pre-
computed by each PMU during session i−1. The public keys
for TV-HORS and ECDSA are multicast to all receivers in
an authenticated manner. For the Incomplete-key-set the keys
are distributed from the key server to PMUs and PDC using a
secure unicast channel. In our implementation, the public keys
are distributed only once. However, to guarantee a reliable
delivery of the keys, we suggest implementing the progressive
public key distribution (PPKD) scheme proposed in [35]. Note
that the relative difference in the key management overhead
between ECDSA and TV-HORS remains the same even when
the reliable key distribution scheme is implemented.
Following the proposals in [13], we use 48-bit light-chain
elements and 80-bit salt-chain elements for TV-HORS. These
parameters along with the t value affect the signature length.
For the perfectly-secure Incomplete-key-set we assume a total
number of receivers equal to 50. For the basic and the
communication-efficient variants of the Incomplete-key-set,
we set the system parameters w = 10 and q = 10−4.
B. Performance results and comparison
In Tables II and III, we present experimental results for
the performance of the candidate authentication schemes.
The results show how the performance of the schemes vary
depending on the values of corresponding parameters for each
scheme. Below, we analyse the results for the schemes and
draw conclusions on which scheme provides a better security
versus performance tradeoff for WAMS.
1) Incomplete-key-set variants: Even though these schemes
use only MAC computations, the large number of such com-
putations introduces large computation and communication
overheads per message that they are inapplicable for WAMS.
Besides, the Incomplete-key-set requires a key server, which is
a single point of failure, whereas EDSA and TV-HORS don’t
use one. Furthermore, key update for the Incomplete-key-set
involves setting up a unicast encrypted channel between the
key server and each of the sources and receivers, while EDSA
and TV-HORS require only an authenticated multicast delivery
of public keys. Therefore, given the large number of sources
8TABLE II: Key management overhead of different multicast authentication schemes.
Key management overhead per session (20 sec)
Scheme key generation time key distribution overhead Key storage overhead key storage overhead
at PMU (ms) at PMU (bytes) at PMU (bytes) at PDC per PMU (bytes)
L=56 L=80 L=56 L=80 L=56 L=80 L=56 L=80
ECDSA without precomputed tokens 3.367 5.335 29 41 14 20 29 41
ECDSA with precomputed tokens 3’340.367 5’447.335 29 41 28’014 40’020 29 41
TV-HORS 523.439 1’047.332 6’154 6’154 1’538’500 3’077’000 6’154 6’154
Basic Incomplete-key-set 0 0 1’932 2’760 1’932 2’760 175 250
Comm. efficient Incomplete-key-set 0 0 7’728 11’040 7’728 11’040 700 1’000
Perfectly-secure Incomplete-key-set 0 0 350 500 350 500 7 10
TABLE III: Performance comparison of multicast authentication schemes using per message computation and communication overheads.
Computation overhead per synchrophasor message Communication overhead (bytes)
Scheme Auth. time (ms) Verif. time (ms) Total (ms) per synchrophasor message
L=56 L=80 L=56 L=80 L=56 L=80 L=56 L=80
ECDSA without precomputed tokens 3.431 5.563 0.223 0.327 3.654 5.890 34 48
ECDSA with precomputed tokens 0.104 0.111 0.223 0.331 0.327 0.442 34 48
TV-HORS 0.014 0.014 0.110 0.217 0.124 0.231 88 106
Basic Incomplete-key-set 4.559 4.589 0.068 0.069 4.627 4.658 1’932 2’760
Comm. efficient Incomplete-key-set 18.151 18.361 0.172 0.181 18.323 18.542 138 138
Perfectly-secure Incomplete-key-set 0.848 0.853 0.018 0.019 0.866 0.872 350 500
(and receivers) in WAMS, the Incomplete-key-set schemes is
inefficient from the key server’s point of view.
2) ECDSA variants: The ECDSA without pre-computed
tokens scheme performs best in all metrics except in the
computation overhead per message. The computation overhead
for both security levels is high, which makes it unsuited for
WAMS applications that have strict real-time requirement.
Adding a cryptographic accelerator hardware to PMUs is one
way to speed up signature generation.
Implementing ECDSA with pre-computed tokens signifi-
cantly improves the computation overhead per message. The
pre-computation of the tokens also introduces a non-negligible
key-generation overhead (we consider token-generation part
of the key generation overhead). However, the tokens for
session i are generated during session i-1. Hence a token-
generation times in Table II for both security levels during a
20 second long session is within the computational capability
of the kind of PMUs deployed in our smart grid. Besides,
there is no significant change in the signing overhead between
L=56 and L=80. The small increase in the overall computation
overhead can be mitigated by deploying more powerful PDCs
or by implementing an optimized ECDSA verification (which
we have not implemented). Therefore, the sub-millisecond
computation overheads and low communication overheads of
ECDSA with pre-computed tokens for both security levels
make it an ideal scheme for WAMS applications with real-
time requirements for the foreseeable future. This finding
is contrary to the generally accepted view that public key
cryptography is inapplicable for real-time applications.
3) TV-HORS: TV-HORS has the lowest computation over-
head and relatively low communication overhead per message.
The only drawback of TV-HORS is that it requires frequently
refreshing the public/private key pair and sending a large
public key message to all receivers. WAMS are normally
characterized by a large number of PMUs. Unless a proper
randomization of key distribution is implemented, a large
public key (≈ 6kbytes) per PMU can cause periodic burst
synchronization of packets that can have significant effect on
the network bandwidth that could lead to synchrophasor packet
loses. The burst of packets from each PMU can also have a
non-negligible computation overhead on the receivers if the
number of PMUs is in the order of hundreds or thousands. This
effect is magnified if the public key has to be sent multiple
times to guarantee reliable delivery.
Lu et al. in [26] identify two potential threats in TV-HORS
when applied to substation automation systems (SAS) - delay
compression attack and key depletion attack. The sending
rate in WAMS is much slower than that of SAS - typically
50 msgs/sec; whereas a typical rate for SMV messages in
SAS is 4800 msgs/sec. In our implementation a signing-key
update occurs at the end of every epoch. An epoch duration
of 80 ms for L=56 or 40ms for L=80 is long enough for any
synchrophasor message to be verified within this time period.
In fact, the overall end-to-end delay for phasor messages
in our smart grid is less than 4 ms. Therefore, the delay
compression attack is not an issue for WAMS. Moreover,
TV-HORS replenishes its key-chain at the end of the last
epoch. The time required to generate the whole key-chain for
P=500 is only 1.047 sec (Table II). Given the relatively lower
message sending rate of PMUs, pre-generating the key-chain
during the 20 sec duration of session i − 1 for session i is
within the computational capacity of the PMUs we used in our
experiment. Hence, the key depletion attack (key generation
speed being slower than the key consumption speed) can also
be ignored as an issue in WAMS. Finally, the comparison
between RSA and TV-HORS in [26] is unfair since the chosen
security levels for the two schemes are not the same.
From the above observations, we can conclude ECDSA
with pre-computed tokens is the preferred scheme for WAMS
applications. In spite of TV-HORS’ desirable low computation
overhead, it has inherent drawbacks due its hard-deadline
requirement to deliver a large public key to receivers within a
short duration. Each private key in a TV-HORS key chain has
a time window during which it can be used to sign messages.
These messages must be verified by the receiver during this
assigned time window or else the message is discarded by the
receiver. The private key cannot be used to sign messages sent
after its time window expires. By the end of the P th epoch, the
9last private key in the key-chain will be used to sign the vth
message of that epoch. Beyond that epoch, the multicast source
has to use a new key-chain to sign new messages. However,
if the public key for this new key chain is not successfully
communicated to the PDCs, they will not be able to verify
the messages signed using the private keys from the new key-
chain. In our experiment, TV-HORS has only 20 sec to reliably
deliver a large public key that is required for the next 20 sec
session. As explained above, this 20 sec duration is a hard-
deadline since the old key-chain cannot be used to sign more
than the number of messages transmitted in 20 sec.
In contrast, ECDSA has a time window of 20 sec to deliver
a relatively small public key for the next session. Besides, the
20 sec session duration for ECDSA is a conservative value.
Hence, ECDSA could continue to use its old public/private
key pair until the next public key is reliably delivered even
beyond the 20 sec time window. The only means to extend
the life time of the private/public key-chain for TV-HORS to
increase P , which in turn introduces key generation, storage
and verification overheads.
The two security levels we consider in our experiment are
relatively high if we assume an attacker with low computa-
tional capabilities. Therefore, utilities who want to protect their
WAMS against such an attacker may be willing to consider
security levels less than 56. From the results in Table III we
see that when the security level is decreased, the improvement
in ECDSA’s signing and verification times are much more
than the other two schemes’. Hence, for lower security levels,
ECDSA with pre-computed tokens is still the preferred scheme
for such systems since it will still have lower overheads in all
the other metrics.
C. Support for addition and revocation
All the three schemes support dynamic addition (revocation)
of senders and receivers to (from) a multicast group. In all the
three schemes, we assume there is a multicast group controller
similar to the one described in [10] that is responsible for
granting and revoking group membership to PMUs and PDCs
and for announcing the addition and revocation of members
to the already existing members.
In all schemes addition/revocation of a receiver (PDC) does
not cause any change in any of the existing group members.
However, addition/revocation of a new source (PMU) to a
group introduces some changes to existing PDCs. The group
controller has to inform all PDCs (receivers) about the identity
of the new PMU. Once informed about the new member, the
PDCs will be able to receive the key material (public key for
ECDSA and TV-HORS) from the new PMU that they can
use to verify messages they will subsequently receive from it.
For the Independent-key-set, the key server has to send the
secondary key set κs to the new PMU s. Performance wise,
addition of a new PMU increases the aggregate verification
time at the PDC. This increase per every additional PMU is
proportional to the verification time in Table III.
Revocation of a PMU involves a controller informing all
PDCs about the identity of the revoked PMU and each PDC
removing the identity (thus the corresponding authentication
key) of the revoked PMU from their list of authentic sources.
Performance wise, revocation of a PMU decreases the aggre-
gate verification times at the PDCs. Again, the decrease in the
aggregate value per every revoked PMU is proportional to the
verification time in Table III.
D. Impact of the scale of WAMS
The aggregate verification time as well as the key storage
requirement at the PDC is proportional to the total number of
PMUs in a multicast group. Therefore, the aggregate time that
a PDC spends processing (verifying the authenticity, decapsu-
lating and aggregating) synchrophasor messages can be large
if the number of PMUs in a group is very large. The IEEE
C37.244 Guide for Phasor Data Concentrator Requirements
for Power System Protection, Control, and Monitoring [37]
specifies a PDC uses a “wait timer” to wait for all messages
to arrive from all PMUs before generating the aggregate data
and passing it on to the state estimator. The value of the “wait
timer” is user defined. Messages from all PMUs should be
verified and aggregated before the timer expires. Therefore, a
utility needs to determine the computational capacity of the
PDC they deploy such that the aggregate processing time for
all PMUs is within this limit. Our results in Table III for
the verification time can be used to find the total number of
PMUs that a PDC can support. Gomez-Exposito et al. in [38]
propose a hierarchical multilevel state estimation framework
to avoid using a single powerful central PDC that deals with
aggregating synchrophasor data from a large number of PMUs.
In such a paradigm, PDCs at the lowest level deal with only a
small set of PMUs that are geographically closer to it and the
PDCs at higher levels correlate pre-filtered data from PDCs
in lower levels and possibly from other PMUs that are close
to them. This way, multicast groups will have a manageable
number of PMUs. The PDCs in the lower levels will be
multicast sources in the multicast group for which the higher
level PDCs are receivers. Hence, PDCs in the lowest level
and in the intermediate levels can be both a receiver in one
multicast group and a source in another multicast group.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have evaluated the performance of avail-
able multicast authentication schemes for WAMS. Contrary to
the generally accepted notion that public key cryptography is
impractical for real-time applications due to its high compu-
tation cost, we have shown that an ECDSA implementation
that utilizes short-term keys and pre-computed tokens for
signature generation provides the required performance for
WAMS based real-time applications. TV-HORS is also widely
treated as the scheme of choice for real-time applications in
smart grid. Our findings show that even though TV-HORS
has very low computation overhead even compared to ECDSA
with pre-computed tokens, its potential drawbacks due to its
hard-deadline requirement to reliably distribute a large public
key makes it less preferable than ECDSA.
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